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Historical Overview on Security: A German Interpretation of the Russian Perspective. The Russian Federation's Foreign and Security Goals

By Christian Wipperfuerth

1. Stability: Protection of Territorial Integrity

For the elites and the population the unexpected dissolution of the USSR is a permanent reminder of their country's potential vulnerability. Russians also even tend to draw comparisons between the 1990s and the "Smuta" in the 17^th century, when the state broke down and millions died. The fear of a breakdown is not wholly unfounded, because a traditionally centralized multi-ethnic power with a weak society like Russia is not as flexible as others to cope with shocks.

Besides that, in the 1990s the boundaries between Russia and its neighbours were generally not acknowledged. Twenty-five million Russians were separated in 1991 by new borders from their homeland, which were in some cases considered as unjust in Russia. But the Kremlin never tried to redraw the map of Russia. The Kremlin's policy is concerned with Russia (and to a comparably very large extent with the well-being of its elites), not with the ethnic Russians. Russian politicians, even the highest, often condemn the (alleged) hardship of their compatriots in certain states of the post-Soviet area. But Russia does nearly nothing for them besides some noisy utterances. The country is interested in stability. The Russian leadership knows that an ethnocentric-nationalistic policy potentially does not just endanger the multiethnic state but would also result in an immediate application for NATO-membership by friendly states like Kazakhstan.

However, the noise that is made to assuage nationalists within Russia could be misinterpreted as expansionism: Some observers took sometimes harsh words at their face value. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US-Security adviser and still influential, for example, warned in 1997: the Russian leadership has a comprehensive plan to subjugate the other former Soviet republics. This interpretation of Russian policy was and is wrong. But it has been heard ever since.

Russia needs and wants stability inside and outside its borders. It demands respect and tends to play hardball with its CIS-neighbours. The opposite is also true, sometimes even truer than the former. But Russia was and is generally busy with itself and the elites are realists to the core (they had and they have to), or you might call them cynics, to try the adventure of an imperial policy. It is typical for an important power which was once an Empire to meddle in the affairs of a foreign country. Russia to an astonishingly extent does not want to, and its ability for that would be limited.

The situation in the Russian part of the Caucasus is more or less under control nowadays; Russia's boundaries are no longer disputed. China for example signed a treaty which includes minor concessions made by the Kremlin. The Russian economy and state have become stronger in the last 10 years, despite all persistent shortcomings, but the feeling prevails, that

(a) the country's territorial integrity might be in danger;

(b) the state's capacity to act and protect the country is to a large extent insufficient.

Democrats, nationalists, as well as representatives of a middle course express this concern every now and then, and since the beginning of the crisis in autumn 2008 with mounting frequency. In September 2008 President Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia would lose the country's Far East if efforts to prevent it were not speeded up. "Even seemingly unshakable things sometimes end in a very dramatic manner", Medvedev warned. Russians understood what he meant.

2. Development within Russia

The cause of the country's vulnerable position is widely seen as a product of the underdevelopment in the economic sphere and of the infrastructure. It is nearly undisputed that one of the most important reasons for the state's breakdown 20 years ago was the strangulation of the economy and society by the horrendous concentration on the armed forces. Therefore the military budget was and is limited; its GDP-share is lower than in Great Britain or the United States. Necessary measures for modernization are occasionally labelled "military build-up" in order to mitigate the nationalistic opposition with just a few words, not deeds.

Russians have the impression that their country contributed a lot to the development of the majority of its neighbours which were long united in a common state, the USSR, and that they got back too little. This view is contestable but shared by the vast majority. Russians do not want to pay the bills for others any longer, to put it bluntly. It was Russia that put an end to the common currency and the customs union of the post-Soviet countries in the 1990s. But the process of disentanglement is long, longer than Russia wants. Even nowadays the CIS countries and the Baltic states pay much less for Russian gas than, e.g., Poland or Germany.

Russia knows what is an imperial overstretch. Two thirds of the Russian population want the other CIS republics to be treated like any other foreign state; just a shrinking minority prefers a policy which strives for domination; a very small minority, especially the elderly, want the restoration of one state within the borders of the former USSR.

Russia wants to spend its resources on the well-being of its inhabitants and the development of the country, not for imperial adventures. It strives and wants to become a full grown Great Power through strengthening the economy. The leadership knows that Russia's ability to act is too limited to be considered a Great Power nowadays. Therefore in the Foreign Policy Concept of June 2008 these words were not mentioned anymore.

At least one factor should be mentioned which hampers the development of Russia to a considerable extent: In comparison to other important powers, Russian politics are extraordinarily driven by personal and group interests. You can call it corruption and nepotism. Firstly, the institutions are weak. Russians therefore have to rely, more than others, on personal relationships and networks. Secondly, the willingness to put one's own interests - in peacetime - last for the sake of the state or society is obviously underdeveloped, because everything can change very quickly. This was not only the lesson from the last decades, but also from before that. So why bother about the state and society if your own fate could change for worse tomorrow. You can not rely on predictability. Enrich yourself.

This tendency hampers the development of Russia to a considerable extent. It holds not only true for the development within Russia but also, to a smaller but nonetheless discernible extent, to its external relations. The circumstances and sometimes the destination of weapons exports seem to be an example. This seems also to be the case in other post-Soviet republics, e.g. the Ukraine.  

3. Sovereignty

Russia has several times tried to join the West-v. President Yeltsin's letter written to the NATO states at the end of 1991 to the effect that Russia might apply for membership in the immediate future. But the letter was not answered. At the beginning of Vladimir Putin's term as president, at the beginning of this decade, numerous signs indicated that Russia wanted to be acknowledged as a power on the western side.

But neither in the 90s nor afterwards did Russia wholeheartedly try to join the West, nor were Western powers ready to open their arms. Russians are not sure if they could and should be a part of the Western civilization, and the West does not know what Russia is - and it is split: Is Russia an alienated relative, who should be welcomed or a potentially dangerous stranger?

During the first terms of President Yeltsin and of President Putin Russia tried to appear like a relative for the West; during the second terms the approach was erratic. Since 2005 Russia left the Western orbit to conduct an independent, sovereign policy. But: Russia needs a cooperative relationship with the West for modernization, to counteract the perceived danger of disintegration. Besides, the elites are interested in keeping their penthouses in Kensington and their villas on the Cote d'Azur. It would be a terrible blow for them to be regarded and treated like, say, the Belorussians.

But mistrust prevails. Neither the elites nor the vast majority of the population trust the goodwill of the outside world. This corresponds to the climate of distrust within Russia, as already mentioned.

The turning point in the Russian-Western relationship was perhaps the "Orange Revolution" in the Ukraine which was not seen as an impressive public movement, but as orchestrated by Western neocons. From this moment on the West was perceived above all not as a remedy for Russia's ills but a danger to its sovereignty, which must be defended against Western interference.

Russian complaints were not wholly unjustified, but hardened to prejudices which sometimes became absurd. It is for example widely believed in Russia, also among Democrats, that Madeleine Albright, the former US Secretary of State, said that the treasures of Siberia are too precious to be owned by just one country. They should be a common heritage for all of mankind. She never mentioned this. It was an invention by just one blogger of unknown origin. But Russians nowadays tend to believe stories that are not favourable of the west - and the other way round.

The prevailing Western reaction to the Georgian attack on South Ossetia was hardly more reasonable.

During the last years the adversaries of cooperation in Russia as well as in Western countries had a strong impact on the relations and strengthened each other. "Change" has changed something since winter, but - the fundamentals? "Freedom is better than non-freedom", this was Dmitry Medvedev's campaign slogan during the presidential election one year ago. If he intends to substantiate his words with deeds - and I think he wants to - could it be done if the West is perceived as an ill-wisher in Russia? This question was especially asked in late summer last year, during and after the war in South Ossetia/

Georgia. Most observers expected a strengthening of the nationalistic and authoritarian trends within Russia. But Medvedev declared in September that Russia needs reforms not to please foreign powers but for its own sake.

In my opinion authoritarian trends will lessen, substantial reforms will be initiated. But the president will demonstrate his independence from the West with harsh words, perhaps harsher than Putin expressed it during the last years. This will be popular and Medvedev needs to prove that he is no "softie" in order to conduct his liberal agenda.