No one doubts he played a major role in the
revival of the Church and the return of religious values in public life. Today
the state sees the Orthodox Church as a partner. But has this relationship gone
too far? Is the Church too close to the state and does this relationship
marginalize other churches and religions in Russia? Should the next patriarch
create some distance from the state?
Sergei
Roy's Comment:
Before I reply to these legitimate
questions, I must define what Albert Einstein called "the position of the
observer": how do I stand in relation to religion in general and the Russian
Orthodox Church in particular? Though these things are generally regarded as
fairly intimate and one's personal, even private business, I think that clarity
in this area may throw light on the writer's bias or lack thereof.
My position here is quite clear if somewhat
negative: I come from a background that has been Voltairean since about the
times of Voltaire. This particularly applied to the male line, who were liable
to exercise their wit, if not wits, at the expense of unshaven Russian priests
(popy), and were also frequently
accused of following the Bacchus and Venus cults rather than any modern
religious or atheist orientations. In the female line there was a tendency to
observe the rituals of the Russian Orthodox Church and, in a few isolated
cases, of Roman Catholicism, but this last was looked upon as some kind of
fashionable nonsense by the rest.
It is easy to see why I comfortably fell in
with prevailing Soviet atheism, though I hated most heartily what was being
done to the Church, its servants and followers, and especially to aesthetically
gratifying things like churches, belfries, icons, monasteries, etc. This
attitude should explain why, toward the end of perestroika, an unbeliever like
me - and there were millions of people like me - welcomed the return of the
Church to Russia's public life and restoration of its stature and physical and
moral presence with warmth rather than hostility or tepid acceptance.
Now, the most highly visible, emblematic
figure of this restoration process was, of course, His Holiness Patriarch Alexy
II of Moscow and All Russia, may God rest his soul. He became that kind of
symbol even before his enthronement in 1990 after Patriarch Pimen's death: in
1989 Alexy was elected to the Congress of People's Deputies.
I must insist that his participation in the
earth-shattering events that attended the sessions of the Congress largely
pre-determined the role Alexy II was to play not just in the revival of the
Russian Orthodox Church but in the state affairs of Russia, an issue that is of
particular interest for us here.
The State and the Church, that is indeed a
thorny issue and a highly complex one: Russia is constitutionally a secular
state, everyone is supposed to enjoy freedom of conscience, freedom to believe
or not to believe anything - yet we constantly see religious leaders, and most
prominently, leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church, participating in state and
public affairs in ways that are far from purely ritualistic.
My take on this is simple: in the given
historical circumstances, Patriarch Alexy II could not have acted differently
from the way he acted - with wisdom, tact, dignity, forbearance, but with vigor
and resolution whenever the occasion called for it.
Consider the coup of August 1991, those
several days when Russia
could have slipped back into the rut of Soviet Communism. Did Alexy II withdraw
to his residence to pray in solitude for God to intercede and prevent
bloodshed? No, he did not. He spoke harshly against the arrest of the country's
lawfully elected president Gorbachev, he actually anathematized the junta that
attempted to grab supreme power in the land, his appeal was heard over the
loudspeakers by the troops preparing to attack us. As someone who spent those
awful 72 hours behind a barricade by the White House of Russia building, I
absolutely believe that Alexy II did his duty before God and man in the only
possible way.
And so it went on. There was another attempted
coup and threat of fratricidal civil war in October 1993, the start of the war
in Chechnya in early 1995, radical liberal reforms that left nearly half the
nation below the poverty line, the 1998 financial meltdown, terrorist acts all
over Russia, and an all too gradual restoration of normalcy in the eight years
of Vladimir Putin's presidency. It took great wisdom and faith to lead the
Russian Orthodox Church and the people of Russia through these turbulent
years, and the events left the patriarch no chance to withdraw from public life
into monastic solitude or limit his activities to church affairs only. His
spiritual leadership has been eagerly recognized by the highest officials of Russia as well as by about two thirds of Russia's
population who count themselves as believers (church attendance, just like the
world over, is a different matter, of course).
Critics may say that under Alexy II the
Russian Orthodox Church began to play too great a role in the affairs of state
in Russia.
All I can say is, thank God that the country was led by people like the late
patriarch, not his critics. And I wish to God that his successor will conduct
himself likewise.