Peter
Lavelle's Question/Commentary: The Russia-EU summit
in Nice France was not easy going, but it went nonetheless. There remain some
fundamental differences separating the two sides. Shouldn't Russia and the EU lower
expectations for a new partnership and cooperation agreement? Even if a new
agreement is hammered out, getting all 27 EU to sign may be next to impossible.
Wouldn't it be better to focus on a small number of issues like trade, energy,
and even security? Until the EU has something approaching a coherent foreign
policy, pursuing grand projects like a partnership is essentially a waste of
time.
Sergei
Roy's Comment:
As we know all too well, talks on a new
EU-Russia treaty, to take the place of the one unveiled in 1997 and expired in
2007, were cut short on September 1st in the wake of the August conflict in the
Caucasus. This EU gesture was meant as
"punishment" of Russia for what Western politicians and propaganda artists like
to describe as the "Kremlin's aggressive foreign policy," of which slapping
down Georgia for its act of naked, genocidal aggression is apparently a vivid
instance.
As punishments go, this one was a distinct,
I'd even say resounding, flop. Russia's
FM Sergei Lavrov made it clear that Russia could jolly well do without
a new treaty altogether, and there is a lot of sense in that. It is not easy to
see how the absence of such a treaty could critically impact relations between Russia's No.1 client and investor - namely, EU,
and EU's biggest energy source - namely, Russia. Particularly in times of global
economic crisis, when markets are at a premium.
At the same time it is clear to both sides
that hammering out such a treaty, or even setting up a format for discussing it
over what looks like quite a long time to come (officials on both sides are
talking of a two-three year time frame at the least), would be an advantage.
For Russia,
that means that the original reason for the suspension of negotiations, this
curious desire to "punish" Russia,
has been put on a very distant back burner by its EU partners, or the vast
majority of them. Diplomatically, this is, if not a victory, then a distinct
sign of progress in relations. Nothing to be sneezed at, in these turbulent
times.
By deciding to resume the treaty talks on
December 2, the EU is clearly cocking a snook at the outgoing US
administration, which still sticks to its nonsensical determination to press
for an annulment of the results of the August conflict by forcing Russia to go
back on its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and to withdraw its troops
from these republics, stationed there at their request.
"We cautioned the EU and its member
states about starting the partnership and cooperation negotiations in light of Russia
not fulfilling the cease-fire agreement," said U.S. Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State David Merkel in a statement to the press. This warning was
clearly not heeded by the EU leaders. It was publicly resented by Nicolas
Sarkozy, whose country holds the rotating presidency of the European Union.
Whatever they may be saying publicly, EU
leaders have clearly made up their minds on the new situation in the Caucasus,
accepted it as a fact of life - much like Russia has accepted the Kosovo
situation - and are shaping their foreign policy accordingly.
Importantly, their decision on the
resumption of talks sends a signal to the incoming US
administration that EU's security concerns - political, military, economic -
are not fully consonant with those of the current US policies.
This means two things at least. One:
European leaders expect the new US
administration's policies, especially vis-à-vis Russia,
to be different from America's
current, clearly unrealistic stance. And
two: the new US
president will find a new format for debating EU-Russia relations already in
operation. He will have to take cognizance of it as a fait accompli and make
proper adjustments to his own foreign policy in this area.
This will surely cramp America's unilateralist style - but
that's what it has been asking for, for the longest time.